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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLEf 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20068 
REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the states statement of facts it asserts that 
this was a circumstantial evidence case. In arguing that 
the state proved Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
the State places great reliance upon the testimony of Matt 
Fish, who was the only witness to identify the Defendant. 
He was also the only witness to be hypnotized and was the 
only witness in which the Court precluded expert testimony 
regarding the effect of hypnosis on memory. His pre-hypnosis 
statement was one page, his hypnotic session was 19 pages, 
and the pre-hypnotic artists rendition was at odds with his 
trial testimony, which had been developed during hypnosis. 
(ADD p 1). 
Dale Babcock did not identify the victim's car as 
being the car that was pulled by the truck up the Summit and 
he was positive that the car was not being towed by a chain, 
whereas the mechanic who examined the car testified that it 
had been towed by a chain. (Tr. of trial P 977). 
Mr. Babcock, after having been advised by the Salt 
Lake Police Department that they were looking for a truck 
and trailer, testified that he did see a truck and trailer 
pulling a car up the Summit. (Tr. of trial P 977). 
It must be kept in mind that the Defendant did not 
deny that his truck and trailer was on the Summit the 
afternoon of September 26, 1983, and Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, 
the Defendant's expert witness testified regarding "unconcious 
transference" wherein historically correct memory is polluted 
by information received after perceiving an event and 
unconsciously merged with accurate information to in affect 
reconstruct memory. (Tr. of trial P 1589-1592). That is to 
say that if the witness is told by the police that they are 
looking for a truck and a trailer towing another car on a 
particular location and he has seen a truck and a trailer, 
he may unconciously combine the two facts and report that as 
memory when it is essentially a reconstruction of unrelated 
information provided to the witness after observing the 
event. 
-2-
The State also relies upon the testimony of William 
Bailey who was also traveling the highway on September 26, 
1983, but in fact the testimony of Mr. Bailey is inconsistent 
with the State's theory of the case and consistent with the 
Defendant's version. Mr. Bailey testified that as he 
crusted the Summit he saw on the off-ramp a single car with 
a male and a female on the outside of that car but did not 
see any truck and trailer parked in front of the car. (Tr. 
of trial p 1010). 
The State also relies upon the testimony of Kent 
Moffet, another witness who was traveling the Summit on 
this occassion. His observations were made while traveling 
approximately 60 m.p.h. in the fast lane, 75 feet away from 
the Summit Park exit. He first disclosed his observations 
on October 21, 1983, approximately one month after the date 
of the homicide, after he had viewed news accounts and had 
been shown a picture of the truck prior to testifying. (Tr. 
of trial Vol. 4 P 1035). When he first disclosed his 
observations, he described the color of the truck as being 
blue and the color of the trailer as being a red trailer. 
(Tr. of trial Vol 4 P 1035). He also described the individual 
as having baldness on most of his forehead, in direct contrast 
to Matt Fish's testimony that the individual was wearing a 
hat. He also indicated in the first interview that the 
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truck was parked approximately 50 feet in front of the white 
car, consistent with Mr. Tuttle's version of the offense, 
and that there was no chain attached between the car and the 
truck. (Tr. of trial Vol 4 P 1037-1038). 
The State also asserts that the physical evidence 
establishes the Defendant's guilt. (Brief of Respondent P 
8). However, the physical evidence or the lack thereof, was 
one of the strongest areas of proof, casting doubt on the 
Defendant's guilt. The only physical evidence tying the 
Defendant to the scene of the crime was one single hair 
which exhibited characteristics similar to Mr. Tuttle's hair 
and could have originated from Mr. Tuttle. This single hair 
was consistent with Mr. Tuttle's explanation of the events 
of that day. Other physical evidence established that a 
single hand print left on the bumper of the white Datsun at 
the location in which the chain would have been attached to 
the vehicle was conclusively established as not being 
Defendant's hand print nor the victim's hand print. (Tr. of 
trial Vol 5 P 1214-1242). Hairs were also removed from the 
white Datsun and the blood soaked clothing of Sidney Ann 
Merrick. Analysis of those hairs revealed that some of 
those hairs had been forceably extracted or pulled from the 
head and they were not the victim's or Mr. Tuttle's hairs. 
(Tr. of trial Vol 5 P1310, 1341, 1343, 1353, and Tr. Vol 7 P 
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1682-1686). 
Also the fingernails of the victim had been bent 
back and there was blood underneath the fingernails of the 
victim indicating the existence of a struggle and the 
existence of scratch marks appearing upon the 
perpetrater of the crime. It was conclusively extablished 
that when Mr. Tuttle arrived back in Evanston, he had no 
blood on his clothing nor any scratch marks on his arms. 
(Tr. of trial Vol 5 P 1188). 
The State also asserts that the pre-hypnosis 
descriptions matched Defendant's appearance on that day. 
"He was wearing a blue shirt and a baseball cap when he 
arrived in Evanston. He had long hair, a long mustache, 
and may have had a growth of a beard." (Respondent's Brief 
P 31). Such is not the facts that were established. It was 
established that Mr. Tuttle shaved prior to going to 
California to deliver the load, (P. 1779), and that he was 
incapable of growing a beard in that length of time. In 
fact, the facial hair on Mr. Tuttle, had he let it grow 
for that period of time, would have been indiscernable. 
(Tr. of trial P 1659-1660). As far as his description 
matching the description Matt Fish gave pre-hypnosis, all 
that was established was that he arrived back in Evanston 
wearing a tee shirt and levis. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE RECENT MAJORITY 
RULE THAT HYPNOTICALLY INDUCED TESTIMONY 
IS INADMISSABLE AT TRIAL. 
In the face of overwelming case law from o the r 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s which ser ious ly question the use of hypnosis 
and s ignf icant ly c u r t a i l i t s use at t r i a l , the Sta te maintains 
that the majority rule is tha t hypnotical ly refreshed testimony 
i s admissab le , and t h a t the w i t n e s s e s p rev ious hypnosis 
af fec ts c r e d i b i l i t y and not admissabi l i ty . 
Although t h i s ques t ion i s a ques t ion of f i r s t 
impression in the State of Utah, recent opinions from other 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s in at l eas t 21 such j u r i s d i c t i o n s l imi t the 
use of testimony from a witness to that which is es tabl ished 
p r i o r t o hypnosis* (See P 21 of A p p e l l a n t ' s Brief and 
Footnote I , which l i s t s the j u r i s d i c t i o n s so h o l d i n g . 
Also see l e t t e r with enclosures dated 6/2/86 to Clerk of 
Utah Supreme Cour t . ) . 
The Sta te r e l i e s upon State vs . Brown, 337 NW 2d 
138 (ND 1983) which held: 
The m a j o r i t y of j u r i s d i c t i o n s appea r 
t o have d e c l a r e d t h a t h y p n o t i c a l l y 
induced tes t imony or r e c a l l g e n e r a l l y 
p o s s e s no b a r r i e r t o a d m i s s a b i 1 i t y f 
bu t , r a t h e r a f f e c t s only the weight of 
the testimony. 
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The Brown decision relies upon seven jurisdictions 
as creating a majority rule. However, of those seven 
jurisdictions, four have recently overruled their opinions 
as sited in Brown. 
The Brown opinion sites the case of State vs. 
McQueen, 244 SE 2nd, 414 (N.C. 1978), as alining itself with 
those courts which allow the admission of hypnotically 
induced testimony. However, in August of 1984, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the 
McQueen opinion in State vs. People, 319 SE 2d, 177 
(N.C. 1984), where it said regarding its decision in McQueen 
as follows: 
At the time of our decision in McQueen, 
however, we were not apprised of the 
problems inherant in hypnosis. Much 
of the literature and judicial analysis 
regarding hypnosis has emerged since 
McQueen was decided. Because of recent 
developments 
hypnosis as 
restore memor 
and the 
a tool to 
y, and th 
away from acceptance o 
refreshed" testimony, 
our position 
understanding of 
refresh or 
e judicial trend 
f "hypnotically 
we now reexamine 
ija McQueen in light of the 
facts before us . 
Our review of the s t a t e of the a r t of 
h y p n o s i s and t h e j u d i c i a l d e c i s i o n s 
which have cons idered the admissab l i ty 
of " h y p n o t i c a l l y r e f reshed" t e s t imony , 
lead us to conclude t h a t our dec i s i on 
in McQueen s h o u l d be o v e r r u l e d in so 
f a r t h a t T t p e r m i t s t h e a d m i s s i o n of 
"hypnotically refreshed" testimony. 
" H y p n o t i c a l l y r e f r e s h e d " tes t imony i s 
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The Brown opinion also sites Pearson vs. State, 
441 NE 2d, 468 (IN 1982), as alining the state of Indiana 
with what it characterizes as the majority opinion. However, 
to the extent that Pearson stood for the proposition that 
hypnotically inducted testimony went to weight not admissablity, 
that opinion was overruled in State vs. Peterson, 448 NE 2d, 
673 (IN 1983), wherein it said at P 675: 
This brings us to Peterson's percise 
issue which is whether or not a 
previously hypnotized witness should be 
permitted to testify in a criminal 
proceeding concerning a subject matter 
adduced during a pre-trial hypnotic 
interview. It is our holding that such 
a witness should not be so permitted to 
testify. (Emphasis added). 
The Brown opinion also aligns Louisiana with 
those jurisdictions establishing what it terms the majority 
position. The truth of the matter is that State vs. Wren, 
425 SE 2d, 756 (LA 1983), does not stand for the proposition 
represented by Brown, nor implicitly argued by the State in 
this case because in Wren there was no significant difference 
between the pre-hypnosis testimony and the post hypnosis 
testimony. The Court in Wren said regarding the Defendant's 
argument that a person who is hypnotized is rendered incompetent 
to testify as established by State vs. Shirley, 641 P2d 775, 
(CA 1982), and Mena supra as follows at 759: 
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In our opinion these cases are 
distinguishable from the present case. As 
we noted earlier, we are not required to 
diLrect,jLy consider whether hypnotically 
induced testimony is admissable in criminal 
trials because Vanderhoeven's hypnosis 
caused him to give no information which he 
had not already given. Therefore, under 
these circumstances, hypnosis should go 
to the question of proper weight to be 
given the testimony rather than to 
the question of admissablity. (Emphasis 
added). 
Additionally, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana 
in State vs. Culpepper, 434 S 2d, 76 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1982), 
ruled that hypnotically effected testimony is not admissable 
where it said at page 83: 
We are of the opinion that the inherent 
hazards in the use of hypnotically 
refreshed testimony are very similar to 
the dangers noted in Catanese in the 
use of polygraph evidence. Consequently 
the reasons assigned in Catanese for 
excluding polygraph results are similarly 
applicable to the exclusion of hypnotically 
affected testimony. 
The most that can be said regarding Louisiana is 
that the Louisiana Supreme Court did not reach the issue 
because the pre-hypnotic and post-hypnotic testimony did not 
differ and the Court of Appeals in Louisiana has specifically 
ruled that hypnotically refreshed testimony is inadmissable. 
Therefore, it is not proper to align Louisiana as Brown did 
as one of the j u r i s d i c t i o n s which hold tha t hypnosis goes to 
weight not admissabli ty. 
Brown a l so s i t e s Tennessee as a l i g n i n g i t s e l f 
with what i t c a l l s a majority opinion in State vs . Glebockf 
616 SW 2d, 897 (Tn. Crim. App. 1981).1 However, the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee State vs . Hartmen, 703 SW 2d, 106, 115 (TN. 
1985), held as follows: 
The t r i a l judge required the State 
t o g i v e Defendant t h e two s t a t e m e n t s 
made by Jackson before the hypnosis and 
t h e s t a t e m e n t made by J a c k s o n d u r i n g 
h y p n o s i s . The t r i a l judge r e s t r i c t e d 
J a c k s o n ' s t es t imony before the ju ry to 
t h e f a c t s he had r e l a t e d in h i s p r e -
hypnos i s s t a t e m e n t and d id no t a l l o w 
any t e s t i m o n y as to the f a c t s e l i c i t e d 
only ^during hypnosis. (Emphasis added). 
To al ign Tennessee with what Brown charac ter izes 
as the majority posi t ion i s not accura te . Tennessee c lear ly 
through Hartman a l igns i t s e l f with those j u r i s d i c t i o n s which 
l i m i t s a w i t n e s s ' s tes t imony to p r e - h y p n o t i c t e s t imony . 
In shor t , Brown c i t e s seven j u r i sd i c t i ons as creating 
a majority pos i t ion . Of the seven, four have been reversed 
or decided in other grounds while 21 j u r i s d i c t i o n s l imi t 
1. In Glebock the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue 
because Defendant fa i led to move to exclude the testimony 
and the Court ruled he have waived any error by fa i l ing to 
objec t . 
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testimony to pre-hypnosis. If anything, the majority 
position is to limit a witness's testimony to that which 
was recalled prior to hypnosis and the minority position, 
which is maintained in Wyoming and North Dakota, is to hold 
that hypnosis goes to weight and not admissablity. (See 
Point 1 of Appellants Brief Specificly F.N. 1 p 21 & 22). 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY THE FRYE 
TEST TO DISALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF 
MATTHEW FISH. 
The State urges the Court to not adopt the Frye 
Test to hypnotic recall. (P 24-27 Respondent's Brief). 
This Court has ruled in Phillips by and through 
Utah etc. vs. Jackson, 615 P2d, 1228, when considering the 
admissability of HLA blood test at page 1233 as follows: 
We next turn to the issue of the legal 
standards which determine the admissability 
of scientific evidence. The most widely 
used standard for making that determination 
was formulated in Frye vs. United States, 
293 F 1013 (DC Cir. 1923): 
The Frye test has been adopted by a 
majority of those jurisdictions in this 
country which have established standards 
to be applied in admitting scientific 
evidence which is new to the courtroom. 
Frye held that scientific tests still in 
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the experimental stages should not be 
admitted in evidence, but that scientific 
testimony deduced from a "well recognized 
scientific principle or discovery' is 
admissable if the scientific principal 
from which the deduction is made is 
'sufficently established to have gained 
general acceptance in the particular 
field in which it belongs1. 
As has been previously noted, Defendant asked 
the trial court to apply the Frye test to the admissability 
of hypnotically induced testimony. This the trial court 
failed to do. In support of Defendant's position. Defendant 
produced an expert witness who testified that hypnosis has 
not been generally accepted by the scientific community as 
a reliable memory enhancement mechanism. Although the 
State did produce an expert witness, he did not testify 
that hypnosis is a generally accepted tool for refreshing 
recollection. In fact, the State failed to illicit any 
testimony regarding the general acceptance in the scientific 
community.2 it cannot be doubted that forensic use of 
hypnosis is a new scientific method for memory enhancement. 
All of the jurisdictions which limit its use have done so 
2. The burden was on the State to show this necessary 
foundation because the state offered the testimony. See 
Utah Rules of Evidence 601 and 602. Any uncertainties 
regarding the foundation and effect of hypnosis on memory 
should be resolved in Defendant's favor. State vs. Martin, 
684 P2d, 651 (WA 1984). 
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based upon the Frye analysis. This Court in Jackson supra, 
has adopted the Frye standard. The record is berift of any 
expert opinion or foundation as required by Frye.3 
The State's effort to bypass the Frye standard is an effort 
to place before the triers of fact a procedure which is 
inherently unreliable and not established by experts as 
being reliable nor generally accepted. 
POINT III 
THE ADMISSION OF THE HYPNOTICALLY 
INDUCED TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW FISH 
WAS NOT HARMLESS TO DEFENDANT. 
The State suggests in Brief of Respondent that 
if there was error it was harmless error. 
Article 1 Section 12, of the Utah State Constitution 
provides among other things' that an accused shall have the 
right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. The 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the 
accused's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 
All of the cases analysing the hypnosis issue have 
analyzed it on the basis of a possible violation of a 
Defendant's constitutional rights either federal or state to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. 
3. Appellant has cited the Court to extensive research 
establishing this. The State has cited none. See Add. to 
Appellant's Brief. 
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The United States Supreme Court in Chapman vs. 
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) , 87 S. Ct. 824, held that 
before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, 
the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that it 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This rule has been 
referred to as the "Harmless-Constitional Error Rule". The 
Supreme Court in Chapman reaffirmed the position taken by 
the Court in Fahy vs. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 
where the Chapman court said at 87 S. Ct. P 828: 
Certainly error, constitional error, 
in illegally admitting highly prejudicial 
evidence or comments, casts on someone 
other then the person prejudiced by it a 
burden to show that it was harmless. It 
is for that reason that the original 
common-law Harmless-Error Rule put the 
burden on the beneficiary of the error 
either to prove that there was no injury, 
or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously 
obtained judgment. There is little if any 
difference between our statement in Fahy vs. 
State of Connecticut about 'whether there 
is a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of might have contributed 
to the conviction' and requiring the 
beneficiary of a constitutional error to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict complained. We therefore 
do know more then adhere to the meaning 
of our Fahy case when we hold as we now do 
that before a federal constitutional error 
can be held harmless the court must be able 
to declare a belief that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.' Chapman vs. 
California (Citation omitted). 
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Consequently before this court may declare 
the error complained of to be harmless error, the State must 
prove that there is not a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of might have contributed to the 
conviction, or put differently, this court must conclude and 
declare a belief that the error complained of was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Utah has adopted the harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in State vs. Chapman, 655 
P2d, 1119 (1982). 
It is interesting to note that the testimony 
of Matt Fish after hypnosis is characterized by the State in 
Respondent's Brief as "inconsequential." (Respondent's Brief 
p 31). However, when this matter was argued to the trial 
court in the State's Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion 
to Suppress the Testimony of Matt Fish, the State characterized 
the testimony of Matt Fish as: 
The testimony of Matt Fish is extremely 
important evidence that will aid in the 
search for truth. The Court should admit 
such testimony with the jury being allowed 
to determine the weight of such evidence. 
(P 16 of State's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
Testimony of Matt Fish.). 
As mentioned previously, the only witness that 
identified that Defendant at trial was Matthew Fish. 
He did not make that identification prior to being hypnotized. 
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He did not mention in his pre-hypnosis statement tha t the 
truck tha t he observed had the word "appache" wri t ten on a 
bug screen. He did not even indicate that the truck had a 
bug screen on i t in his pre-hypnosis a r t i s t ' s r end i t ion . In 
the pre-hypnotic statement he made some effor t to ta lk about 
writ ing tha t appeared on the side of the pick-up truck thus 
i n d i c a t i n g , h i s a t tempt to remember d e t a i l . The t r i a l 
judge c h a r a c t e r i z e d h i s tes t imony as " s e l f - a s s u r e d " and 
"def in i te" at the t r i a l which occured af ter hypnosis. The 
l i t e r a t u r e i s r ep le t e with repor t s of increased confidence 
l e v e l s by persons who are hypno t i zed . The l i t e r a t u r e 
suggests tha t t h i s increased confidence level has nothing to 
do with whether or not the informat ion i s h i s t o r i c a l l y 
accura te . One need only look at the sheer volume of the 
informat ion induced dur ing hypnosis as opposed to t h a t 
reca l led pr ior to hypnosis. The State was more accurate 
in i t s charac te r iza t ion of Matt F i sh ' s testimony pr ior to 
t r i a l as being "extremely impor t an t " , than i t i s in i t s 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of M a t t F i s h ' s t e s t i m o n y a s 
" inconsequent ia l ." 
The d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t he gave p r e - h y p n o t i c a l l y 
was: 
The guy was medium b u i l d wi th a da rk 
colored baseball cap on wearing a l i gh t 
blue s h i r t . He had a scroungy appearance. 
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Whereas at trial he was able to positively identify 
the Defendant as being the driver of the truck. The hypnotic 
session was extremely suggestive. He first suggested that 
the car that was being towed was tan. The officer said: 
"Can you remember the driver of the little white ahh 
little Datsun car?" The officer also asked him regarding 
the driver of the truck: "Do you remember what color hair 
he had? Fish's response was "red." The officer's response 
was then "brown?" Fish: "Red - not real red." He also 
described the person as having a beard when in fact the 
Defendant could not grow a beard and his work duties prohibited 
a beard. In the pre-hypnosis statement he had indicated 
that there was writing on the door. During the hypnosis 
session he indicated that it was blank. In the pre-hypnotic 
statement he did not describe any bug shield or any writing 
on any bug shield. However, during the hypnotic session he 
identified a bug shield with the writing thereon. Pre-
hypnotically he described the drivers shirt as blue and 
during hypnosis as white and red, white, and blue. In 
the pre-hypnotic statement he simply mentions that he was 
wearing a hat. In the hypnotic statement he says that the 
cap was red. 
It is obvious that the hypnotic session had a 
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tremendous influence upon Matt Fish's testimony. Had he 
been limited to his pre-hypnotic testimony then the error 
complained of would be significantly diminished. However, 
such was not the case. This court will not be able to make 
a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was 
harmless. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO PUT ON 
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE EFFECT OF HYPNOSIS 
ON MEMORY AND SUCH DENIAL CONSTITUTED A 
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah State Constition 
provides a criminal Defendant with the right to due process 
of law. 
The United States Supreme Court in Washington vs. 
the State of Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) 87 S. Ct. 1920, held 
that the right of the accused to offer testimony of a 
witness and to compel their attendances if necessary is in 
plain terms the right to present a defense and a fundamental 
element of due process of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of 
State vs. Long, 36 Ut. Adv. Rep., 11, 12, (UT 1986), held 
that the failure to give a cautionary instruction on 
eyewitness testimony may be violative of Defendant's rights 
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under Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution by 
holding at page 18: 
Given the great weight jurors are likely 
to give eyewitness testimony, and the deep 
and generally unperceived flaws in it, to 
convict a Defendant on such evidence 
without advising the jury of the factors 
that should be considered in evaluating it 
could well deny the Defendant due process 
of law under Article 1 Section 7 of the 
Utah Constition. 
In Long supra, the Court after reviewing difficulties 
inheriant in any use of eyewitness identification testimony 
held that: 
We are convinced that, at a minimum, 
additional judicial guidance to the jury 
in evaluating such testimony is warranted. 
We therefore today abandon our discretionary 
approach to cautionary jury instructions 
and direct that in cases tried from this 
date forward, trial courts shall give such 
an instruction whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a 
case and such an instruction is requested 
by the defense. 
This same analysis should control the receipt 
of expert testimony regarding hypnosis.5 
The case most heavily relied upon by the State 
5. See Justice Stewarts dissenting opinion in State vs. 
Malmrose, 649 P2d at 62-66 adopted in Long as the majority 
position. 
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that of State vs. Brown supra, which held that hypnosis 
affects credibility and not admissability went on to hold at 
337 NW 2d, at page 151: 
Should a decision result in exposing the 
jury in each case to the testimony of 
expert witnesses as to the reliability and 
uses of hypnosis as an investigative tool, 
so be it. . . Expert scientific and 
phenomenium Pi a criminal trial setting. 
(Emphasis added). 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held in 
Commonwealth vs. Kater, 447 NE 2d 1190, that it was 
error to admit hypnotically induced testimony but had this 
to say regarding the issues on retrial at page 1200: 
At the retrial of this case, based on 
our study of the record, we conclude that 
the hypnotized witnesses may testify only 
as to their present memory of events known 
to them prior to hypnosis. The Defendant 
may, if he wishes, present evidence 
bearing on the effect of hypnosis on a 
particular witness and on witnesses in 
general. He may also present evidence 
tending to show that each hypnotic session, 
and any attempted hypnotic session, was 
conducted in a manner likely to effect 
both a witness's present memory of events 
and a witness's degree of confidence in 
his or her memory. 
In the Addendum to Appellant's Brief, Appellant 
this Court with scientific studies involving the 
use of hypnosis. All of those studies conclude 
provides 
forensic 
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that the effect of hypnosis on a witness is to increase 
confidence levels while not increasing the factual accuracy 
of the information recalled.6 
This Court in I^ oiig. recognized that research 
undermines the common notion that the confidence with which 
an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator 
of the accuracy of the recollection. Long supra at P 16. 
The Defendant in this case called Dr. Elizabeth 
Loftus, a recognized expert in both the frailities of 
eyewitness indentification testimony and hypnosis and the 
effect on memory. She testified at Volume 6 Pages 1584-1602 
regarding the memory process as referenced in Long supra. 
However, the Court in apparent reliance upon State vs. Griffin, 
626 P2d, 478 (UT 1981), ruled that she would not be able to 
testify regarding the effect of hypnosis on memory. 
The State in Respondent's Brief suggested Appellant 
was not entirely candid with this Court, such is not true. 
A simple example will suffice. If a witness is testifying 
against a Defendant and that witness has two convictions for 
felony theft, and the Court, for whatever reason, rules that 
cross-examination may reveal one conviction but not both, 
can it then be argued that Appellant is less then honest 
6. Research indicates that accuracy decreases during 
hypnosis over non-hypnotic recall (Add. to Appellant's 
Brief P 41). 
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with this Court by stating that he was not allowed to go 
into the second conviction? That is exactly what happened 
in this case. The Defendant wished to not only attack 
eyewitness testimony in general, but also point out to the 
jury the effect of hypnosis on a witness's confidence level. 
The Court relied upon State vs. Griffin supra, in ruling 
that it was discretionary and then denied the request. The 
Court's reliance upon Griffin is seriously brought into 
question by this Court's ruling in State vs. Long supra. 
The Court in Long adopted the dissent of State vs. Malmrose 
supra as controlling precedent in this State, and the 
majority position in Malmrose relied upon State vs. Griffin 
supra, in holding that the receipt of expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification was within the discretion of the 
trial court. As articulated by Justice Stewart in his 
dissent in State vs. Malmrose, which is adopted in Long as 
controlling. 
The trial court's refusal on the facts 
of this case, to admit expert testimony on 
the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification and its failure to instruct 
the jury sua sponte on the appropriate 
precaution with which eyewitness 
identification should be viewed, require a 
new trial in my view. (649 P2d 62). 
Although Long supra dealt with jury instructions 
regarding eyewitness testimony, it would be ludicrous to 
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suggest that the jury must be instructed regarding eyewitness 
testimony but not be allowed to receive evidence regarding 
that same issue. 
The trial court's ruling that hypnosis went to 
weight and not admissability and then denying the Defendant 
an opportunity to meaningfully attack hypnosis through 
expert testimony including the effect of hypnosis on a 
person's confidence level, denied the Defendant an opportunity 
to put on a defense, to call witnesses in his own behalf and 
to due process of law. 
POINT V 
THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF 
IS NOT SUBJECT TO HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS 
AND REQUIRES THIS COURT TO REVERSE HIS 
CONVICTION AND ORDER A NEW TRIAL. 
As n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y , t h e Defendan t has t h e r i g h t 
t o due p r o c e s s of law under A r t i c l e 1 S e c t i o n 7 of t h e Utah 
S t a t e C o n s t i t u t i o n and i t s f e d e r a l c o u n t e r p a r t . 
The Un i t ed S t a t e s Supreme Cour t i n Chambers v s . 
M i s s i s s i p p i , 93 S. C t . 1038 f 1045 ( 1 9 7 3 ) f h e l d t h a t : 
The r i g h t of an a c c u s e d i n a c r i m i n a l 
t r i a l t o due p r o c e s s i s , i n e s s e n c e , t h e 
r i g h t t o a f a i r o p p o r t u n i t y t o d e f e n d 
a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e ' s a c c u s a t i o n s . The 
r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t a n d c r o s s - e x a m i n e 
w i t n e s s e s s and t o c a l l w i t n e s s e s i n o n e ' s 
own b e h a l f have l ong been r e c o g n i z e d a s 
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essential to due process. Mr. Justice 
Black writing for the Court In re: Oliver 
(Citation omitted)r identified these 
rights as among the minimum essentials of 
a fair trial: 'A person's right to 
reasonable notice of a charge against him 
and an opportunity to be heard in his 
defense - a right to his day in court - are 
basic in our system of juris prudence; and 
these rights include, as a minimum, a 
right to examine the witnesses against 
him, to offer testimony, and to be 
represented by counsel'. (Emphasis added). 
In Chapman vs. State of California supra the United 
States Supreme Court held, in fashioning a constitional 
harmless error rule that there were some constitutional 
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error. Citing Payne vs. State 
of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (Coerced confession), Gideon 
vs. Wainewright, 372 U.S. 335 (Right to counsel), and 
Tumey vs. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (Impartial judge). 
The United States Supreme Court also held in 
Washington vs. State of Texas, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 
(1967), that due process includes as a minimum the right 
to call witnesses and put in a defense. 
Recently the United States Supreme Court in 
Rose vs. Clark, 39 Cr.L. 3278, decided July 2, 1986, applied 
the Chapman Constitional Harmless Error Rule to a Sandstrom 
burden shifting instruction, concluding that such instruction 
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was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but recognized 
that some errors necessarily render a trial fundamentally 
unfair. Noting at 39 Cr.L. 3279, F.N. 6, that each of the 
examples, Chapman cited as error that could never be harmless 
either aborted the basic trial process or denied it all 
together, and held at 39 Cr.L. 3279 as follows: 
Harmless error analysis thus presupposes 
a trial at which the Defendant represented 
by counsel may present evidence and 
argument before an impartial judge and 
jury. (Emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court in Halloway vs. 
Arkansas, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1182, (1978), held that a claim 
of conflicting interest borne by an attorney was not harmless 
error because the court could not undertake the harmless 
error analysis pursuant to Chapman because it would consist 
of speculation. Where it said: 
In the case of joint representation 
of conflicting interest the evil-it 
bears repeating-is what the advocate finds 
himself compelled to refrain from doing, 
. . . . thus our inquiry into a claim 
of harmless error here would require, 
unlike most cases, unguided speculation. 
(Emphas is added). 
The error complained of here should not be subject 
to Chapmans harmless error analysis because it aborted the 
"basic trial process" i.e., Mr. Tuttle's right to call 
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witnesses to challenge the accuracy of the single eye 
witness in this case, presupposed in Clark as essential 
before Harmless Error analysis can apply.7 Harmless 
error analysis in this case would involve speculation as to 
the effect of evidence that was never received. 
CONCLUSION 
The important interest in protecting constitional 
rights of all persons accused as well as protecting the 
central integrity of the criminal justice system requires 
that Mr. Tuttle's conviction be reversed because the error 
complained of denied Mr. Tuttle the basic trial process 
and under the circumstances of this case can never be 
harmless. Even under Harmless error analysis the error 
complained of was not harmless. 
DATED this day of August, 1986. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of August, 
1986, I hand delivered four copies of the foregoing REPLY 
7. Even applying Harmless error analysis to this issue 
would require reversal. 
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Honorable Philip R. Fishier, Judge, presiding. 
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